

THE FAILED INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF GENDER EQUALITY UNDER LOCAL ELITE CAPTURE IN VILLAGE GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES

Hartika Arbiyanti¹, Afgan Fadilla², Surfian Rahmat AP³, Fullah Jumaynah⁴, Chomariyana Kartika Hesti⁵

^{1,2,3,4,5}Universitas Pembangunan Nasional Veteran Jakarta

Email Korespondensi: chomariyanakh@upnvj.ac.id

Email: hartikaarbiyanti@upnvj.ac.id; afganfadilla@upnvj.ac.id; surfian@upnvj.ac.id;

fullahjumaynah@upnvj.ac.id

ABSTRACT

The decentralization of village governance is expected to create inclusive democratic spaces and promote gender equality at the grassroots level. However, these normative ideals frequently collide with the reality of local power dynamics. Based on a critical literature review, this article investigates how local elite capture and rent-seeking motives hijack gender mainstreaming policies in village governance. The study finds that in the planning phase (*Musrenbangdes*), women's participation is reduced to "false inclusion" a mere administrative checklist to fulfill requirements for the release of Village Funds, while their strategic proposals are systematically ignored. This exclusion smoothly paves the way for local elites to massively divert the village budget (*APBDes*) into capital-intensive physical infrastructure projects. This budget hijacking is driven by rent-seeking opportunities and financial kickbacks for elite networks, leaving women's empowerment and human development programs severely underfunded. Ultimately, this study concludes that without strict structural oversight and the active strengthening of women's independent political agency, gender equality in village governance will remain an empty document serving only to preserve local oligarchic power.

Keywords: Elite Capture, False Inclusion, Gender Equality, Rent-Seeking.

ABSTRAK

Desentralisasi tata kelola pemerintahan desa diharapkan mampu menciptakan ruang demokrasi yang inklusif serta mendorong kesetaraan gender pada tingkat akar rumput. Namun demikian, cita-cita normatif tersebut sering kali berbenturan dengan realitas dinamika kekuasaan lokal. Berdasarkan tinjauan literatur kritis, artikel ini menginvestigasi bagaimana fenomena penangkapan elite (*elite capture*) lokal dan motif pemburuan rente (*rent-seeking*) membajak kebijakan pengarusutamaan gender dalam tata kelola pemerintahan desa. Studi ini menemukan bahwa pada tahap perencanaan (*Musrenbangdes*), partisipasi perempuan direduksi menjadi sebatas "inklusi semu" yakni sekadar pemenuhan daftar periksa administratif sebagai syarat pencairan Dana Desa sementara usulan-usulan strategis mereka diabaikan secara sistematis. Eksklusi ini dengan mulus membuka jalan bagi para elite lokal untuk mengalihkan Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Desa (*APBDes*) secara masif ke arah proyek-proyek infrastruktur fisik yang padat modal. Pembajakan anggaran ini didorong oleh adanya peluang pemburuan rente dan aliran imbal balik finansial (*kickbacks*) bagi jaringan elite, yang pada gilirannya mengakibatkan program pemberdayaan perempuan dan pembangunan manusia mengalami defisit pendanaan yang parah. Pada akhirnya, studi ini menyimpulkan bahwa tanpa adanya pengawasan struktural yang ketat serta penguatan aktif terhadap agensi politik perempuan yang independen, kesetaraan gender dalam tata kelola pemerintahan desa hanya akan menjadi dokumen kosong yang berfungsi sekadar untuk melestarikan kekuasaan oligarki lokal.

Kata kunci: Inklusi Semu, Kesetaraan Gender, Pemburuan Rente, Penangkapan Elite.

INTRODUCTION

The decentralization of power and the strengthening of autonomy at the grassroots level should ideally serve as a breath of fresh air for the realization of inclusive and equitable governance. In the discourse of local politics, the village is no longer conceptualized merely as an administrative extension of the state, but has evolved into an autonomous democratic arena (Annahar et al., 2023). This transition promises the opening of deliberative spaces where all elements of society have an equal footing in formulating the direction of development. Normatively, this governance architecture has adopted the principle of Gender Mainstreaming, which mandates the meaningful involvement of women in every policy cycle. However, these ideal expectations often collide with harsh realities (Gupta et al., 2023). In practice, the vision of inclusivity experiences a reduction in meaning, shrinking into a mere illusion of bureaucratic formalism where the gender equality agenda is positioned solely as an administrative instrument utilized merely to fulfill procedural obligations to ensure the flow of budget allocations from the supravillage level.

The failure to transform these inclusive values is not merely an administrative weakness, but a structural anomaly in the institutionalization process of local governance. Drawing on the perspective of new institutionalism, the set of formal rules governing equality has evidently failed to penetrate the realm of informal institutions deeply rooted in society (Elomäki & Ylöstalo, 2021). True institutionalization demands that inclusive values be internalized into the norms and rules of the game that bind all actors. In reality, women's presence in essential forums such as the Village Development Planning Deliberation (*Musrenbangdes*) still revolves around the practice of procedural formalism. Their involvement is pseudo-participatory, reduced to statistical figures to meet attendance quotas, while their political rationality and agency to advocate for the equitable distribution of resources are systematically silenced or ignored.

According to (Goetz, 2020) the stagnation in the institutionalization of gender equality values does not occur in a vacuum. This condition is a logical consequence of the strong grip of local elite capture that subjugates the village governance structure. The public sphere in the village is essentially not a neutral and egalitarian ecosystem, but an arena of contestation fraught with asymmetrical power relations. Historically and culturally, this arena has been dominated by a handful of elites ranging from village heads, local bureaucratic patrons, traditional figures, to economic elites the majority of whom take refuge behind the fortress of patriarchal culture. This elite alliance not only monopolizes access to information and social capital but also utilizes village institutional authority to maintain their group's hegemony (Noak, 2024).

Through the lens of local political economy, the introduction of gender equality and transparent governance discourse is viewed by the elites as a disruption that threatens the *status quo*. According to (Harianti & Choiriyah, 2025) women's political empowerment has the potential to overhaul resource distribution patterns and disrupt the patronage practices that have sustained the village oligarchy. As a form of resistance, local elites practice policy hijacking. This is most evident in the orchestration of the Village Revenue and Expenditure Budget (*APBDes*). Budgets that ideally contain allocations for women's empowerment programs, inclusive health, or social protection are easily and unilaterally diverted into physical infrastructure projects. Beyond reasons of political populism, the dominance of physical projects is heavily tinged with rent-seeking motives that benefit the elite's crony networks at the grassroots (Szanyi, 2023).

The manifestation of this elite capture culminates in the sterilization of inclusive policies within the actual decision-making arena. Various affirmative regulations instructed by the supravillage are systematically stripped of their substance when colliding with the power structures at the village level (Jiang & Zeng, 2020). The complex problems that repeatedly occur in the field demonstrate that women and vulnerable groups are not only alienated from access to village financial governance information but are also prevented from intervening in program directions. Consequently, crucial issues such as stunting mitigation, subsistence economic empowerment, and social protection for grassroots women frequently fail to receive adequate budget allocations, or are degraded merely into residual programs with minimal leverage.

According to (Pramono & Juliana, 2025) problems underscores that the primary pathology in village

Penerbit:

LKISPOL (Lembaga Kajian Ilmu Sosial dan Politik)

redaksigovernance@gmail.com/admin@lkispol.or.id

171

Indexed



governance is not a technical-administrative issue, but an acute institutional crisis and inequality of power relations. As long as the local power architecture still provides room for oligarchs to hijack the public agenda, any attempt at gender mainstreaming will only result in an illusion of inclusion. Therefore, this study adopts a critical stance to deeply investigate and expose how the failed institutionalization of gender equality operates under the shadow of local elite hegemony. By dismantling the anatomy of political domination at the village hall, this article aims to evaluate the effectiveness of existing regulations while reformulating a roadmap towards local democracy that is not merely responsive on paper, but substantively inclusive and equitable. The stark contrast between the normative ideals of village autonomy and the actual realities operating at the grassroots level is summarized in Table 1.

Table 1: The Gap Between Ideal Concepts and Actual Realities in Village Governance

| Governance Aspect | Ideal Concept (Expectations of the Village Law) | Reality on the Ground (Actual Practice) |
|---------------------|---|---|
| Deliberative Space | An open forum where all citizens have an equal right to voice their opinions in village planning. | Limited to a mere formality; discussions are dominated by village elites while the voices of vulnerable groups are ignored. |
| Budget Allocation | Village funds are distributed fairly to enhance human quality and collective welfare. | Hijacked for group interests (rent-seeking); budgets are heavily diverted toward physical projects that benefit crony networks. |
| Women's Involvement | Women are meaningfully involved, and their voices are heard in shaping policy directions. | Remains an illusion of inclusion; women's presence is used solely as an attendance requirement to secure fund disbursement. |

Source: Processed by Author (2026)

Table 1 explicitly outlines the fundamental contradictions between the normative expectations mandated by the decentralization framework and the institutional realities operating at the grassroots level. In a truly autonomous system, the deliberative space is envisioned as an open, egalitarian forum where all citizens possess an equal footing to shape the trajectory of village development. However, reality demonstrates that these forums are frequently reduced to mere procedural formalities. The planning process is heavily monopolized by village elites, transforming the deliberative arena into an exclusive space where the voices of vulnerable groups are systematically ignored. This monopolization of the public sphere directly paves the way for the hijacking of resource allocations. Instead of distributing village funds equitably to stimulate human capacity and collective welfare, local elites divert these budgets massively toward physical infrastructure projects. This redirection is heavily driven by rent-seeking motives, as physical projects provide direct material incentives and financial loopholes that exclusively benefit local crony networks.

Furthermore, this institutional anomaly severely impacts the agenda of gender mainstreaming. Although normative regulations demand the meaningful involvement of women in shaping policy directions, their participation is consistently marginalized into an illusion of inclusion (Kumari et al., 2023). Women's presence at the village hall is frequently mobilized and objectified solely to satisfy the administrative attendance quotas required by the supravillage government to ensure the disbursement of village funds. Their political agency is stripped away, leaving them as passive spectators whose strategic needs are continually sidelined by the patriarchal interests of the local oligarchy.

This stark dichotomy between ideal concepts and actual realities underscores a critical flaw in how village governance is traditionally analyzed. While existing literature has predominantly evaluated village autonomy through the lens of administrative compliance, quantitative participation rates, and the physical outputs of village funds, it frequently treats the village hall as a neutral public sphere. Such mainstream perspectives leave a critical theoretical gap by overlooking the informal power relations, rent-seeking

Penerbit:

LKISPOL (Lembaga Kajian Ilmu Sosial dan Politik)

redaksigovernance@gmail.com/admin@lkispol.or.id

motives, and the systematic silencing of marginalized groups. Therefore, this study adopts a critical stance to fill this void. By exposing the hidden anatomy of local elite capture, this article aims to evaluate why the institutionalization of gender equality remains stagnant, offering a novel perspective to reformulate a roadmap towards local democracy that is substantively inclusive and equitable.

METHOD

This research employs a qualitative method employing a critical literature review approach. This approach was selected as it allows the researcher to explore, deconstruct, and understand the patterns and anomalies of power relations concealed within previous studies (Wright & Michailova, 2023). Through an in-depth textual dissection of scholarly articles, this research aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of the institutionalization of gender equality within village governance and its intersection with the practice of local elite capture. This framework provides a sharp analytical space to identify empirical findings, methodological biases in previous studies, and research gaps within the discourse of local politics.

As a literature study, this research does not rely on traditional samples or respondents. The object of the research is focused on a corpus of scholarly articles examining gender mainstreaming, decentralization, and the dynamics of village governance. The unit of analysis consists of peer-reviewed publications indexed in highly reputable academic databases, both globally and within national accredited portals. Article retrieval was operationalized through the *Publish or Perish* tool using a specific combination of keywords, including "*Gender Mainstreaming*," "*Village Governance*," "*Elite Capture*," and "*Tokenism*." To maintain conceptual novelty and relevance, the literature population was purposively limited to recent contemporary publications that represent the dynamics of post-decentralization governance.

The data collection process was conducted through digital footprint tracing of secondary data sources. The data extraction phase was orchestrated through systematic steps: scanning academic databases via the *Publish or Perish* tool, extracting publication metrics in RIS format alongside their full-text documents, and subsequently integrating them into the *Mendeley Desktop* software. In the context of this research, *Mendeley* functions as a reference management instrument as well as a repository for conducting initial literature screening and categorization to ensure the validity of the included articles.

During the data analysis phase, this study applies a critical thematic analysis technique by (Alhojailan & Ibrahim (2012) . Distinct from quantitative mapping, thematic analysis demands the active engagement of the researcher in interpreting the text. The analytical process is conducted through data reduction, wherein articles are codified into matrices of central themes such as the manifestations of, local elite vetoes, and mechanisms of village budget hijacking. Following categorization, the literary texts are cross-referenced to identify the consistency of findings and to specifically unmask how these mechanisms of elite domination are institutionalized (Novianti et al., 2026).

Through this methodology, the research does not merely summarize literature narratives descriptively, but projects a sharp qualitative analysis. This approach facilitates the study in laying bare local institutional pathologies and demonstrating how elite capture systematically sabotages the substantive implementation of inclusive policies at the grassroots level.

DISCUSSION

The implementation of post-decentralization village governance reveals a massive structural anomaly. Affirmative regulations regarding gender mainstreaming systematically suffer paralysis when colliding with local power architectures. The primary finding of this study indicates that the failed institutionalization of gender equality is not an excess of technical incompetence or women's low administrative capacity, but rather the result of an unwritten design sustained by local elite hegemony across various regions (Goetz, 2020). Referring to the national trend of Village Fund misappropriation, village governments following Law No. 6 of 2014, instead of transforming into egalitarian deliberative arenas, are frequently reconfigured into instruments for preserving the *status quo*. Local elites primarily the village head, village officials, and

Penerbit:

LKISPOL (Lembaga Kajian Ilmu Sosial dan Politik)

redaksigovernance@gmail.com/admin@lkispol.or.id

173

Indexed



influential local figures often manipulate formal procedures merely to appear compliant with higher government directives. In reality, they actively block any programs that could threaten their control over village resources (Haboddin & Afala, 2022; Ruan & Wang, 2023; Yin & Rui, 2023).

The clearest example of this fake compliance can be seen in the Village Development Planning Deliberations (*Musrenbangdes*). Previous studies consistently show that women's presence in these important meetings is reduced to a mere administrative formality. According to Rubin & Bartle (2023) women are treated simply as a headcount to fulfill attendance checklists, which is a mandatory requirement to release the Village Funds. Within this illusion of participation, discussions and policy proposals are completely controlled by the male-dominated views of the elites. Voices advocating for women's economic empowerment, maternal health, or social protection are constantly ignored, interrupted, or dismissed as unimportant issues (Lwamba et al., 2022). This silencing is not an accident, but a deliberate strategy by the elites to ensure that the direction of village programs continues to serve their own political networks. The sharp contrast between these formal rules and the actual practices at the village level is clearly illustrated in Table 2.

Tabel 2: The Gap Between Formal Rules and Actual Practice in Musrenbangdes

| Governance Aspect | Formal Rules | Actual Practice at the Village Level | Dominant Actors |
|---------------------------|---|---|-------------------------------------|
| Women's Representation | Fulfillment of affirmative attendance quotas in village forums. | Physical presence serves merely to fulfill the administrative checklist prerequisite for the disbursement of Village Funds. | Village Head & Village Apparatus |
| Articulation of Interests | A deliberative space accommodating proposals from all demographic groups. | Proposals regarding economic empowerment, maternal health, and social protection are systematically interrupted or deemed non-urgent. | Community Leaders & Local Patrons |
| Decision-Making | Decisions are made through egalitarian deliberation and consensus. | Decisions are absolutely dominated by the masculine rationality of elites to maintain the <i>status quo</i> . | Village Bureaucratic Elite Alliance |

Source: Processed by Author (2026)

Table 2 clearly shows how structural gaps operate within the *Musrenbangdes* meetings, demonstrating that grassroots inclusivity is currently reduced to a mere administrative formality. Formally, regulations require a quota for women's representation to make the meeting valid. However, reality on the ground shows that this physical presence is manipulated by village elites into a practice of surface-level compliance a condition where the village government adopts inclusive rules purely to gain legal approval and secure the release of Village Funds, without changing the unequal power balance at the village hall at all. In this context, women are invited not as active participants with a real voice, but are treated simply as numbers or a checklist requirement (Rezaee et al., 2022). This practice of false inclusion forms the first layer of the cover-up that hides the absolute control of the local elites.

At the second layer, this gap manifests brutally in the process of interest articulation. As the deliberation unfolds, structural oppression occurs, degrading the proposals of marginalized groups. Voices demanding budget allocations for strategic gender issues such as women's economic empowerment, malnutrition (*stunting*) mitigation, or social safety nets are systematically silenced. This silencing is not always a frontal prohibition of speech, but rather occurs through interruption, marginalization, and discursive engineering by masculine elites who label these humanitarian issues as peripheral, consumptive, and non-urgent (Wicaksana et al., 2025). The village elites, dominated by the village head and local patrons,

Penerbit:

LKISPOL (Lembaga Kajian Ilmu Sosial dan Politik)

redaksigovernance@gmail.com/admin@lkispol.or.id

monopolize the definition of what constitutes "development," which is almost exclusively and narrowly directed toward capital-intensive physical construction (Kang, 2020; Keudel, 2023).

This proves that the *Musrenbangdes* fails to become a public sphere that facilitates communicative rationality, mutating instead into a political theater where the script has been entirely authored by the elites. The culmination of this institutional anomaly occurs during the decision-making phase. Although procedures promise an egalitarian consensus, the final outcome of the deliberation is fundamentally the product of an elite veto. Decisions are not reached through a logical and equal contestation of arguments, but are dictated by deeply rooted patron-client power relations within the village. The agreement of the attending citizens, including women's groups, is frequently a manufactured consent resulting from economic and social dependencies on local patrons. According to Sheffer (2021) the inability to resist this elite veto ensures that the trajectory of village governance policy continues to revolve on the same axis: preserving the *status quo*, nurturing crony networks, and locking the gender equality agenda down to mere rhetorical documentation on bureaucratic desks.

Once the gender equality agenda is successfully marginalized from the planning space, the practice of elite capture finds its concrete realization in the orchestration of the Village Revenue and Expenditure Budget (*APBDes*). This study finds that resistance to gender-responsive programs is highly correlated with the political-economic motives of local actors. Human empowerment agendas (such as women's skills training or stunting mitigation) are avoided because they are deemed to provide no direct material incentives for the elite structure. Conversely, the posture of the *APBDes* is massively diverted toward capital-intensive physical infrastructure projects. According to Kurniawan (2025) the dominance of these physical projects serves not only as an instrument of populism to nurture the electoral viability of the village head but also facilitates rent-seeking practices that benefit crony networks and oligarchies at the grassroots level. The systematic correlation between these elite priorities, their rent-seeking motives, and the consequent marginalization of the gender equality agenda within the village budget is comprehensively detailed in Table 3.

Table 3: Patterns of Elite Capture in the Village Budget

| Village Program Category | Political-Economic Motive | Impact on Gender Equality |
|--|--|---|
| Capital-Intensive Physical Infrastructure (Construction of roads, archways, buildings) | Facilitates rent-seeking (project kickbacks), provides material incentives, and nurtures the electoral populism of the Village Head. | Village budgets are massively drained, leaving an extremely narrow fiscal space for human development agendas. |
| Women's Capacity Empowerment (MSME training, rights literacy) | Perceived as a structural threat and generates no direct financial incentives for the elite or crony networks. | Results in the stagnation of economic independence and a persistent lack of women's political agency at the grassroots. |
| Health and Social Protection (<i>Stunting</i> mitigation, <i>Posyandu</i> nutrition) | Funded in the most minimal proportion purely to ensure the <i>APBDes</i> report passes verification by the regency government. | Strategic gender needs (reproductive health and social safety nets) are continually reproduced as peripheral issues. |

Source: Processed by Author (2026)

Table 3 starkly demonstrates how the exclusion of women in the planning space culminates in the most concrete manifestation of power: the hijacking of the Village Revenue and Expenditure Budget (*APBDes*) allocation. According to Lhutfi et al. (2024) through the lens of local political economy, the *APBDes* is not merely a neutral document containing rows of accounting figures; rather, it is a political manifesto reflecting

Penerbit:

LKISPOL (Lembaga Kajian Ilmu Sosial dan Politik)

redaksigovernance@gmail.com/admin@lkispol.or.id

175

Indexed



who controls the resources. The domination of capital-intensive physical infrastructure projects is not a technical coincidence, but a calculated design by the elites. According to Ma et al. (2022) Concrete and asphalt infrastructure serves as the perfect political commodity; it is highly visible to voters, nurturing the electoral populism of the village head, while simultaneously providing vast loopholes for rent-seeking practices.

According to Kabeer (2020) Conversely, the elites' reluctance to fund women's capacity empowerment programs stems purely from highly pragmatic rational calculations. Programs such as MSME training or rights literacy education are systematically avoided for two fundamental reasons. First, human capacity-building programs do not generate project commissions that can be enjoyed by the elite structure. Second, and most crucially, empowering women economically and politically is perceived as a structural threat to the local patron-client ecosystem (Sultan & Sultan, 2020). Women who are economically independent and aware of their political rights potentially evolve into rational entities critical of power monopolies. Therefore, nullifying empowerment budgets serves as a political instrument for elites to preserve compliance and suppress the emergence of women's political agency at the grassroots (Goyal, 2024; Sithirith, 2014; Sutrisno et al., 2023)

The profound irony of this budget governance is evident in the health and social protection category. Funding for *stunting* mitigation or *Posyandu* operations is frequently allocated, yet its proportion is suppressed to the absolute minimum as a tactic of bureaucratic survival. According to Arifin et al. (2020) Village elites fund these programs purely to ensure their *APBDes* documents are not rejected during the verification process by the supravillage government (sub-district or regency). This reality concludes that the village financial instruments have entirely succumbed to elite capture practices; they no longer function as tools for equitable welfare distribution, but have mutated into machines for the perpetuation of oligarchic power, while continually reproducing women's issues as a peripheral (Meldianto et al., 2024; Rahmadani & Saputra, 2025)

CONCLUSION

Based on the literature review, this study concludes that the implementation of gender equality in village governance is currently trapped in a cycle of false inclusion and elite capture. While the decentralization of village autonomy promised equal democratic spaces, the reality shows that local elites have successfully hijacked this system. In the planning phase (*Musrenbangdes*), women's participation is reduced to a mere administrative checklist a mandatory headcount requirement used purely to secure the release of Village Funds. Their actual voices and proposals for strategic needs, such as maternal health and economic empowerment, are systematically ignored and dismissed by male-dominated elites.

Furthermore, this exclusion in the planning space smoothly paves the way for the hijacking of the village budget (*APBDes*). Village funds are massively diverted into capital-intensive physical infrastructure projects. This dominance of physical development occurs not because it is always the most urgent community need, but because these projects provide lucrative opportunities for rent-seeking and financial kickbacks that directly benefit the local elites and their networks. In contrast, human development programs are starved of funding because they do not generate material incentives for the elites and are viewed as a structural threat to their grip on local power.

Ultimately, fixing this deep-rooted issue requires much more than just administrative checklists or attendance quotas. It demands strict structural oversight from higher government levels regarding how village funds are planned and spent. More importantly, it requires the active strengthening of women's independent political agency at the grassroots level. Without dismantling the unequal power relations at the village hall, any gender mainstreaming policy will remain an empty document, and village funds will continue to serve as a tool to enrich the local oligarchy rather than a means to achieve genuine, inclusive community welfare.

REFERENCE

- Alhojailan, M. I., & Ibrahim, M. (2012). Thematic analysis: A critical review of its process and evaluation. *West East Journal of Social Sciences*, 1(1), 39–47.
- Annahar, N., Widianingsih, I., Muhtar, E. A., & Paskarina, C. (2023). The road to inclusive decentralized village governance in Indonesia. *Sustainability*, 15(11), 8616.
<https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.3390/su15118616>
- Arifin, B., Wicaksono, E., Tenrini, R. H., Wardhana, I. W., Setiawan, H., Damayanty, S. A., Solikin, A., Suhendra, M., Saputra, A. H., & Ariutama, G. A. (2020). Village fund, village-owned-enterprises, and employment: Evidence from Indonesia. *Journal of Rural Studies*, 79, 382–394.
<https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrurstud.2020.08.052>
- Elomäki, A., & Ylöstalo, H. (2021). From promoting gender equality to managing gender equality policy. *International Feminist Journal of Politics*, 23(5), 741–762.
<https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1080/14616742.2021.1880289>
- Goetz, A. M. (2020). The politics of preserving gender inequality: de-institutionalisation and re-privatisation. *Oxford Development Studies*, 48(1), 2–17.
<https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1080/13600818.2019.1672144>
- Goyal, T. (2024). Representation from below: How women’s grassroots party activism promotes equal political participation. *American Political Science Review*, 118(3), 1415–1430.
<https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055423000953>
- Gupta, G. R., Grown, C., Fewer, S., Gupta, R., & Nowrojee, S. (2023). Beyond gender mainstreaming: transforming humanitarian action, organizations and culture. *Journal of International Humanitarian Action*, 8(1), 5. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1186/s41018-023-00138-1>
- Haboddin, M., & Afala, L. O. M. (2022). Formation of Local Elite Power Base in Local Politics: “The Emerging” and “The Surviving.” *Jurnal Politik*, 8(2), 3.
- Harianti, I., & Choiriyah, I. U. (2025). Village Government Roles in Strengthening Women’s Empowerment Programs: Peran Pemerintah Desa dalam Memperkuat Program Pemberdayaan Perempuan. *Indonesian Journal of Public Policy Review*, 26(4), 10–21070.
<https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.21070/ijppr.v26i4.1462>
- Jiang, J., & Zeng, Y. (2020). Countering capture: Elite networks and government responsiveness in China’s land market reform. *The Journal of Politics*, 82(1), 13–28.
<https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1086/705595>
- Kabeer, N. (2020). Women’s empowerment and economic development: a feminist critique of storytelling practices in “randomista” economics. *Feminist Economics*, 26(2), 1–26.
<https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1080/13545701.2020.1743338>
- Kang, Y. (2020). Dispersed domination through patron-clientelism: the evolution of the local state NGO relationship in post disaster Sichuan. *Journal of Contemporary China*, 29(124), 598–613.
<https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2019.1677367>
- Keudel, O. (2023). Transforming Patronal Democracy Bottom-Up: Two Logics of Local Governance in Ukraine. *Ukraine’s Patronal Democracy and the Russian Invasion*, 373–394.
<https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.7829/jj.3985461.17>
- Kumari, S., Nanduri, S., Sharma, H., & Batar, S. (2023). Women in politics: examining their impact on policy development—A comprehensive review. *Multidisciplinary Reviews*, 6(1), 202.
<https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.31893/multirev.2023ss034>
- Kurniawan, R. (2025). Patronage Networks and Power Disparities: The Legacy of Political Patronage in Indonesia’s Governance and Democracy. *Jurnal Politik Profetik*, 13(1), 1–32.
<https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.24252/profetik.v13i1a1>
- Lhutfi, I., Ludigdo, U., Rusydi, M. K., & Baridwan, Z. (2024). Political economy of accounting (PEA) perspectives on sustainable development goals (SDGs) toward local government’s budgeting in Indonesia. *Cogent Social Sciences*, 10(1), 2388170.

Penerbit:

LKISPOL (Lembaga Kajian Ilmu Sosial dan Politik)

redaksigovernance@gmail.com/admin@lkispol.or.id

177

Indexed



SINTA 4

PKP|INDEX



- <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1080/23311886.2024.2388170>
- Lwamba, E., Shisler, S., Riddlehoover, W., Kupfer, M., Tshabalala, N., Nduku, P., Langer, L., Grant, S., Sonnenfeld, A., & Anda, D. (2022). Strengthening women's empowerment and gender equality in fragile contexts towards peaceful and inclusive societies: A systematic review and meta-analysis. *Campbell Systematic Reviews*, 18(1), e1214. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1002/cl2.1214>
- Ma, X., Whiting, S. H., Zhang, T., & Zhao, T. (2022). Vote buying as rent seeking: Land sales in China's village elections. *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 57(3), 337–360. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1007/s12116-022-09355-y>
- Meldianto, R. P., Hanida, R. P., & Hasnita, S. S. (2024). EXPLOITATION OF WOMEN IN THE CHANGING POWER DYNAMICS. *Jurnal Governansi*, 10(2), 137–146. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.30997/jgs.v10i2.13611>
- Noak, P. A. (2024). Political clientelism in rural areas: Understanding the impact on regional head elections in Indonesia. *Journal of Ecohumanism*, 3(7), 3898–3909. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.62754/joe.v3i7.4517>
- Novianti, S., Ayuningtyas, W. E. P., Wicaksana, H. D., Pertiwi, G., & Hesti, C. K. (2026). REPRESENTATION, GENDER, AND PUBLIC POLICY: CONTEMPORARY PRACTICES IN INDONESIA. *GOVERNANCE: Jurnal Ilmiah Kajian Politik Lokal Dan Pembangunan*, 13(3), 93–105.
- Pramono, R., & Juliana, J. (2025). Beyond tourism: Community empowerment and resilience in rural Indonesia. *Tourism and Hospitality*, 6(4), 210. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.3390/tourhosp6040210>
- Rahmadani, F., & Saputra, T. (2025). Navigating Cultural and Structural Barriers: Women's Political Organizing under Patriarchal Malay Customs and Political Oligarchy in Riau. *Managerial Development Journal*, 1(1), 132–141.
- Rezaee, M., Verde, A., Anchang, B., Mattonen, S. A., Garcia-Diaz, J., & Daldrup-Link, H. (2022). Disparate participation by gender of conference attendants in scientific discussions. *PLoS One*, 17(1), e0262639. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0262639>
- Ruan, J., & Wang, P. (2023). Elite capture and corruption: the influence of elite collusion on village elections and rural land development in China. *The China Quarterly*, 253, 107–122. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305741022001217>
- Rubin, M. M., & Bartle, J. R. (2023). Gender-responsive budgeting: A budget reform to address gender inequity. *Public Administration*, 101(2), 391–405. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/padm.12802>
- Sheffer, L. (2021). Political accountability, legislator gender, and the status quo bias. *Politics & Gender*, 17(3), 365–401. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1017/S1743923X19000825>
- Sithirith, M. (2014). The Patron Client System and Its Effect on Resources Management in Cambodia: A Case in the Tonle Sap Lake. *Asian Politics & Policy*, 6(4), 595–609. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/aspp.12135>
- Sultan, S., & Sultan, W. I. M. (2020). Women MSMEs in times of crisis: challenges and opportunities. *Journal of Small Business and Enterprise Development*, 27(7), 1069–1083. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1108/JSBED-06-2020-0226>
- Sutrisno, S., Permana, R. M., & Junaidi, A. (2023). Education and training as a means of developing MSME expertise. *Journal of Contemporary Administration and Management (ADMAN)*, 1(3), 137–143. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.61100/adman.v1i3.62>
- Szanyi, M. (2023). Rent-seeking Business Elites and Populism in Poland and Hungary. *Business and Populism: The Odd Couple*, 138.
- Wicaksana, H. D., AP, S. R., Amelia, S., Haikal, M., & Hady, A. P. (2025). Excelling on Campus, Lagging in the Workplace: The Paradox of Gender Equality in Indonesia. *JPW (Jurnal Politik Walisongo)*, 7(2), 171–206.

Penerbit:

LKISPOL (Lembaga Kajian Ilmu Sosial dan Politik)

redaksigovernance@gmail.com/admin@lkispol.or.id

178

Indexed



GOVERNANCE: Jurnal Ilmiah Kajian Politik Lokal dan Pembangunan

ISSN: 2406-8721 (Media Cetak) dan ISSN: 2406-8985 (Media Online)

Volume 13 Nomor 5 Mei 2026

Wright, A., & Michailova, S. (2023). Critical literature reviews: A critique and actionable advice. *Management Learning*, 54(2), 177–197.

<https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1177/13505076211073961>

Yin, J., & Rui, J. (2023). Sustainable endogenous development path based on rural local elite governance model: A case study of Xiamen. *Sustainability*, 15(11), 8882.

<https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.3390/su15118882>

Penerbit:

LKISPOL (Lembaga Kajian Ilmu Sosial dan Politik)

redaksigovernance@gmail.com/admin@lkispol.or.id

179

